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The ongoing saga of judicial independence in
Poland
Next month the Court of Justice of the European Union will make a decision that
is likely going to feature in the future textbooks on European Union law. In the
case C-618/19 Commission v Poland, the Court will tackle the topic of judicial
independence and the question of whether the standards of the rule of law were
violated by the Polish government and parliament and thus address a critical
element of European Union’s legal system. In doing so, the CJEU will likely answer
some long overdue questions regarding what the rule of law in the European Union
is. More importantly, it will possibly counter an attempt at hostile takeover of Polish
Supreme Court by the government. After 8 years of political debates on the rule of
law in the European Union, 24th June 2019 could finally bring a landmark judgment
on controversial reshaping of domestic institutions which has occurred in several EU
member states.
The judgment will  have major implications for Poland, where the ruling party
Prawo i Sprawiedliwo## (Law and Justice, PiS), which enjoys both a parliamentary
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majority and the support of the President, has altered the legal and institutional
landscape in ways seen by scholars as an example of creeping authoritarianism.1)W.
Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown, Oxford University Press, forthcoming
2019. The bulk of these measures have been introduced by means of laws
passed by the Polish parliament and signed into law by President Andrzej Duda.
Until now PiS has been unable to alter the Polish constitution itself, for it lacks
the parliamentary supermajority necessary to pass the threshold required for
constitutional amendments to be adopted.
These measures have led the Polish government on a collision course with the
European Union’s institutions and resulted in the European Commission launching
the art. 7 TEU procedure against Poland in December 2017. At the same time,
Poland remains a country with high public support for the European Union and any
ruling by the CJEU which would indicate that the government is imperilling Poland’s
position in the EU would likely be a political problem for the government.
After taking office in 2015, the PiS packed the Constitutional Tribunal and the
National Council of Judiciary with loyal leadership and government-friendly judges
and members. It then turned its eyes towards the Supreme Court of Poland. The
first attempt at subjugating the Court has been carried out in 2017 and entailed
removal of all sitting judges and a complete re-organisation. But the ruling party’s
plans triggered massive protests and continued pressure led to the President Duda
vetoing the most egregious elements of the legislation (for a detailed account of legal
reforms and EU reactions, see our analysis from 2018). This symposium deals with
the second attempt at taking over the Supreme Court. Yet the upcoming judgment,
important as it is, is but one element of an array of proceedings before the CJEU
related to independence of Polish judiciary. Just recently the CJEU heard the case
Commission v. Poland (C-192/18) which concerns the lowering of retirement age of
judges of ordinary courts in Poland. Furthermore, various Polish courts have lodged
requests for preliminary rulings on questions related to political influence on the
judiciary and the use of disciplinary proceedings.2)Request for a preliminary ruling
from the S#d Okr#gowy w #odzi (Poland) lodged on 3 September 2018 — City of
#owicz v State Treasury — Governor of #ód# Province (Case C-558/18), Request
for a preliminary ruling from the S#d Okr#gowy w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 5
September 2018 — Criminal proceedings against VX, WW and XV (Case C-563/18) 
And just few days ago, the Supreme Court has requested for a preliminary ruling
regarding the status of new Supreme Court judges appointed by the taken-over
National Council of Judiciary, setting up an opportunity for the CJEU to look into the
effect which the NCJ has on independence of the entire Polish judiciary. Keeping
this context in mind is important, as no matter how ground-breaking the upcoming
judgment is, there will be more in the coming months on CJEU and the status of
Polish judiciary.
Why should Europeans from other countries care?
Why does the Polish Supreme Court matter? Apart from its rather obvious domestic
importance as the highest instance of proceedings in civil, criminal, labour, military
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and social security matters, the Polish Supreme Court has the competence to
elaborate binding interpretation of any law which falls under its jurisdiction. For
example, the Supreme Court established that telecom operators are directly
liable for mass adverts sent out via text messages and robocalls conducted
by outsourced companies, thus curtailing the practice of telecoms evading
punishment for spamming by subcontracting such services and deflecting liability
on subcontractors.3) Resolution of the Supreme Court of Poland from 17th February
2016, III SZP 7/15
But above all, the Supreme Court of Poland is also a European Union court, one that
applies European Union law and ensures that mutual recognition and trust within
the European Union’s legal sphere are respected. The legal system of the European
Union is based on the notion that member state courts and authorities recognise
rulings of courts in other member states without second-guessing whether these
judgments are issued by an independent and impartial court. In that respect, the
European Union legal system can be compared to a brick building where national
courts of member states represent individual bricks. Take one brick out and a wall
may fall apart when other national courts and authorities refuse to cooperate with a
problematic court and call into question mutual recognition of decisions and rulings
issued by courts in such country.
Another aspect of Supreme Court’s importance is its role in elections, including
elections to the European Parliament. Firstly, the Supreme Court rules on electoral
protests and has the sole competence to declare elections and referendums
valid. Matters related to elections are being currently dealt with by one of newly
established chambers of the Supreme Court. Secondly, the Supreme Court
delegates three of its members to the National Electoral Commission, which
oversees the organisation and conduct of elections in Poland. One cannot forget that
for all its transnational importance and pan-European character, the elections for the
European Parliament are essentially 28 national elections cobbled together. Once
again, the European Union law assumes that conduct of elections and handling of
electoral protests in every member state are overseen by impartial and independent
bodies. The wall/brick metaphor applies here as well. If there is no trust in the
independence of Polish courts, electoral disputes could well be perceived as similar
to the struggles over election results in countries outside the EU, such as Kenya or
Ukraine during the Orange revolution.
Is CJEU moving to block the second attempt of the
Supreme Court take-over?
The case C-619/18 Commission v Poland, also known as “Supreme Court judges’
retirement age case”, arose from a law adopted in 2017 which was an element of
the second attempt to remove “thorny” judges of the Supreme Court. This time, the
letter of the law was more subtle. It didn’t outright remove the judges from office, it
merely lowered the mandatory retirement age, which would in turn lead to retirement
of a substantial number of justices, including the First President of Supreme Court,
Prof. Ma#gorzata Gersdorf. The “removal by early retirement” tactic eerily resembled
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the one employed earlier in Hungary. To nuance things further, the President of
Poland was given a fully discretionary power to keep the judges in the office, were
they to request that of him. For the superficial observer, the reform may have
seemed a harmless but complex technicality. In practice, it amounted to a sweeping
alteration of the composition of the Supreme Court and would have paved the way to
installing new leadership of the court (it is worth noticing that such sudden concern
for prompt early retirement of judges was not extended to the government-friendly
Constitutional Tribunal).
The law entered into force in April 2018. After the Commission exchanged letters of
formal notice with Poland in July and August 2018, it elaborated a reasoned opinion,
alleging that Poland had failed to fulfil its obligations under the combined provisions
of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights. Throughout the dialogue with the Commission, Poland
responded that the Commission’s position is unfounded and requested closure of
the procedure. Having exhausted its means for action, and apparently surmising that
further political dialogue will lead nowhere, the Commission lodged an application
with the CJEU on 2 October 2018, bringing an action under art. 258 TFEU against
Poland for infringement of its obligations under the primary law.
Two major events followed. The CJEU accepted the Commission’s request for
interim measures on 17th December 2018 and ordered Poland to immediately adjust
legislation in order to reverse the premature retirement of Supreme Court judges.
This was a watershed moment, for if the Polish government was to ignore the order
and brazenly defy the CJEU, it would have legally and politically declared an end
to accepting the EU legal order. But the government backed down and the law in
question was voided. For now, Prof. Ma#gorzata Gersdorf remains a sitting judge
and the First President of the Supreme Court of Poland.
The second major event in this case was the opinion by Advocate General (AG) E.
Tanchev, issued on 11th April 2019. P. Bogdanowicz provided an analysis of the
opinion in an earlier Verfassungsblog article. Firstly, the AG rebuffed the arguments
of the Polish government concerning inadmissibility of the case due to the fact the
relevant laws have been revised following the Court’s interim order. Secondly, he
stated that yes, the Commission can bring an infringement action under art. 258
TFEU while there is an ongoing art. 7(1) TEU mechanism triggered with respect to
particular member state. Thirdly, the AG proposed that the Court should declare that
Poland failed to fulfil its obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1)
TEU to "provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields
covered by Union law".
We have come a long way from cases about
electricity bills and dairy products
Independence of the judiciary and standards of the rule of law have not been
frequent matters for the CJEU. The Court was up to now confronted with relatively
marginal questions related to the rule of law, e.g. of whether a quasi-judicial body
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fulfils the standards of independent judiciary. The picture changed in 2018, when
a professional association of Portuguese judges brought a case before the CJEU,
claiming that austerity measure that affected judges’ pensions had an adverse
effect on their capability as independent and impartial judiciary.4)M. Bonelli, M.
Claes, Judicial serendipity: how Portuguese judges came to the rescue of the Polish
judiciary: ECJ 27 February 2018, Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes
Portugueses. 14(3) European Constitutional Law Review, p. 622-643, 2018. In
doing so, the applicants provided the CJEU with an opportunity to elaborate on
the standards of judicial independence, and fortuitously did so before the rulings in
Polish cases. The Court then delivered a landmark ruling outlining the role of judicial
independence as an element of the rule of law and declaring itself competent to
evaluate the guarantee of independence of those national judges who apply and
interpret EU law under Article 19(1) TEU. For more on this, see M. Ovádek here.
In the past, the CJEU occasionally surprised the legal world, passing landmark
judgements in cases that had seemed mundane. A dispute about tariffs on urea
formaldehyde became the staple case of any EU law textbook in form of the ruling
in case Van Gend en Loos. In this case, however, all eyes are on the CJEU from
the get-go, as possible consequences of the upcoming judgment, both legal and
political, are tremendous. Obviously, the significance for Poland will be immense,
but it is also a defining moment for European Union law and for the notion of the EU
enforcing respect for its core values – democracy, the rule of law and human rights –
vis a vis member states.
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